Fiscal Justice under Asymmetric Decentralization: Accountability in the Management of Special Autonomy Funds in Papua

This article critically examines the legal accountability in the use of Special Autonomy Funds in South Papua, Indonesia. Despite a statutory structure governing public financial management, empirical outcomes reveal persistent inefficiencies, poor fiscal absorption, and widespread public mistrust. Using a normative-empirical method, this study combines doctrinal analysis with field data from Asmat Regency, one of the primary beneficiaries of these funds. Results show that financial mismanagement, delayed reporting, limited community oversight, and weak enforcement have hindered effective fund utilization, undermining the constitutional goals of social justice and equitable development. Although the law mandates transparency and accountability, in practice legal obligations are frequently underenforced, and oversight bodies lack sufficient authority or resources. The study advocates for legal reform that integrates participatory mechanisms, strengthens institutional auditing, and imposes legal sanctions for violations. It also proposes the disaggregation of Special Autonomy Funds from general fiscal transfers to enhance transparency. The novelty of this article lies in its contextual legal evaluation that integrates fiscal justice, indigenous rights, and structural governance analysis within the asymmetric decentralization framework of Indonesia. These insights offer a valuable contribution to comparative legal scholarship on decentralization, indigenous autonomy, and public finance accountability in developing democracies.